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How to protect backups from ransomware

To protect backups from ransomware, keep at least one copy off site that your computers can add to but can't delete or change, with older versions kept for weeks. Guard that copy with credentials no everyday computer or account holds, so a stolen admin password can't erase it. A USB drive that stays plugged in, or a folder that syncs to the cloud, doesn't qualify, because ransomware reaches it the same way it reaches your files. Then prove the backup works by restoring from it every month.

Backups are one of the recurring jobs in running IT for a small office without an IT person, and the one that decides whether a ransomware attack costs a day or a month. They're also item 4 in the cybersecurity checklist for small businesses. This post covers the part most backups get wrong, which is surviving the attack itself.

Why ransomware goes after backups

Ransomware works by making your files unusable until you pay. A good backup takes that pressure away, so attackers look for it first. The #StopRansomware Guide from CISA, the FBI and the NSA says "many ransomware variants attempt to find and subsequently delete or encrypt accessible backups to make restoration impossible unless the ransom is paid." It also tells responders to watch for misuse of Windows' own tools for shadow copies and backups, calling it "a common ransomware technique to inhibit system recovery."

The word that matters is accessible. If a computer in your office can reach the backup with its own login, so can anyone who takes over that computer.

The FBI's ransomware advice in the 2025 IC3 annual report (page 15) asks for off-site or offline backups, maintained and restored regularly, with all backup data "encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted)," covering all of the organization's data.

What the 3-2-1 rule means

The 3-2-1 rule is the classic backup advice. A 2012 paper written for US-CERT, now on CISA's site, says to keep 3 copies of any important file (the original and 2 backups), on 2 different types of media, with 1 copy off site (Data Backup Options).

It still holds for fire, theft and a dead drive. It predates ransomware that hunts for backups, though. An off-site copy in the cloud counts as off site, but if the same password that runs your office can delete it, an attacker with that password can delete it too. The FBI's word "immutable" fills that gap. It means at least one copy that nobody can change or delete until its time is up.

Which backups can ransomware reach?

Where the copy lives Survives a dead drive Survives ransomware on the computer Survives a stolen admin password Off site
USB drive left plugged in Yes No No No
USB drive unplugged and taken home Yes Yes, if it was unplugged at the time Yes Yes
Network storage that shows up as a drive letter Yes No No No
Synced folder (OneDrive, Dropbox, Google Drive) Yes Only through version history or a rollback No Yes
Cloud backup the computer can delete Yes Only if the attacker doesn't find it No Yes
Off-site copy the computer can't delete, with locked versions Yes Yes Yes, until the lock expires Yes

The USB drive taken home works when someone remembers every night. In most offices, nobody does for long.

Synced folders are the usual false comfort. Microsoft's support page on synced files says a deleted online-only file "is removed from all devices and from the cloud." Files damaged by ransomware sync too, which is why OneDrive has a way to roll back after malware. Microsoft 365 subscribers can restore their whole OneDrive to a point in the last 30 days. The same page warns that a file permanently deleted from the Recycle Bin "can never be recovered." It's a recovery feature inside the same account the attacker may control, not a separate backup.

Keep an off-site copy that can't be deleted

NIST's storage security guideline, SP 800-209, defines immutability as "the ability to lock data after it has been created, thereby preventing it from alteration or deletion," and recommends considering immutable storage for recovery copies (recommendation IS-SS-R10). Cloud storage services offer it under names like object lock, retention lock or immutability policies. The #StopRansomware Guide asks for the same thing in cloud storage, with "delete protection or object lock," plus versioning, which keeps older copies of each file.

What you want in practice:

  • A copy outside the office, in storage your computers send data to but can't erase.
  • Versions kept long enough to reach back before an attack. The #StopRansomware Guide notes that a ransomware event may be evidence of an earlier compromise nobody caught, so measure the history in weeks, not days.
  • A lock period that applies to administrators too, so the copy survives someone stealing the admin password.

The guide adds a caution worth hearing. Immutable storage "does not meet compliance criteria for certain regulations and misconfiguration can impose significant cost." A locked copy can't be deleted early when you want it gone, either, so you pay to store it until the lock ends. Decide the lock period on purpose.

Use separate credentials for the backups

A backup is only as safe as the login that can delete it. SP 800-209 says recovery copies should be reachable only by a small group using credentials separate from the ones they use for daily work, so that "if the credentials of an IT admin are compromised, the attacker cannot use those credentials to access the cyber-attack recovery copies" (IS-SS-R3). In the public cloud, it says, that means a separate account (IS-SS-R1).

For a small office, that comes down to four rules:

  1. The backup service's admin login isn't your Microsoft 365 or Google admin login, and it has MFA.
  2. The credential each computer uses to send backups can add data but can't delete it.
  3. Nobody signs in to the backup console for everyday work.
  4. The backup's encryption password or recovery key is written down and kept somewhere offline, such as a safe, since a backup nobody can decrypt is no backup.

Test your restores

A backup nobody has restored from is a guess. CISA's small business guidance says "It's critical to regularly test partial and full restores," and warns that some ransomware victims found restoring took far longer than they expected. SP 800-209 suggests testing at least monthly for critical data (DP-SS-R3) and running periodic test restores to confirm you can meet the time you need (RA-SS-R5). CISA's Cybersecurity Performance Goals set a floor of once a year (goal 3.O).

A schedule that fits a small office:

  • Every month, restore a few files from different computers and open them. Restore the database behind your main software too, such as a QuickBooks company file or your practice management system, and open it in the program.
  • Every year, restore a whole computer or the shared drive, and write down how long it took.

After a real attack, check what you're restoring before you trust it. The CPGs say to validate the integrity of backups before restoration and check them for signs of compromise, and the #StopRansomware Guide warns that ransomware often arrives on top of earlier malware, which has to be found before rebuilding.

Questions for your backup provider or IT person

If someone else runs your backups, the #StopRansomware Guide says to make sure they follow these practices and to put your requirements in the contract. These questions need no technical knowledge, and each has a specific answer:

  1. Where is our off-site copy, and can a computer in our office delete or change it?
  2. If someone stole our admin password today, could they delete the backups? For how many days could we still restore?
  3. How far back can we restore, and how many versions do you keep?
  4. When was the last test restore, what did it restore, and how long did it take?
  5. Does the backup include the database for our main software, or only documents?
  6. Who gets the alert when a backup fails, and what happened after the last one?
  7. If you disappeared tomorrow, how would we restore, and where are the keys?

"We have backups" doesn't answer any of them. A date, a number and a place does.

How Crashcart Backup answers those questions

Crashcart Backup runs nightly on each Windows computer and Mac where you turn it on, encrypted and off site, with a separate backup and key for each computer. A computer can add to its backups but can't delete them, and anything removed or overwritten can be brought back for 30 days. Every week Crashcart restores a sample of files and compares them to the originals. In an October 2026 lab test, we encrypted 600 files on a test computer, then used that computer's own backup key to delete its backups. All 600 files came back matching the originals. You choose which computers it covers, and you keep a printed recovery kit for restoring without Crashcart.

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